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JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN A TIME
OF LEGAL REALISM
William P. Marshall
Charles Geyh's article, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the
Realm of Political Rhetoric,1 makes an outstanding contribution to the
growing literature on the subject of judicial independence. His taxon-
omy setting forth three categories of judicial accountability-
institutional, behavioral, and decisional-is particularly insightful in
helping us distinguish between relatively uncontroversial attempts to
hold the judiciary accountable, such as efforts to improve judicial
administration or actions against judges for personal ethical viola-
tions, and the more problematic challenges to judicial independence
that arise when politicians attack judges for issuing decisions they do
not like. One, therefore, is immediately tempted to congratulate Pro-
fessor Geyh for accomplishing his announced purpose of "rescu[ing]
judicial accountability from the realm of political rhetoric."2
But a critical aspect of Professor Geyh's analysis deserves closer
examination. In his discussion of decisional accountability, Geyh
leaves open the possibility that judges can be sanctioned for certain
improper judicial decisions. Specifically, he asserts that judges should
be held accountable for willfully deciding cases wrongly. As he
states, "It is hard to quarrel with the notion that judges should be ac-
countable for intentional decision-making error: the judge who makes
such errors has knowingly violated her oath of office, in which she
swore to uphold the law."3
Geyh is acutely aware that opening up the judiciary to sanction on
grounds of legal error is risky business. On that account, he proposes
that there should be a strong presumption against any finding that a
judge's erroneous decision was willfully made. Borrowing from libel
t Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
I Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political
Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911 (2006).
2 Id. at914.
3 Id. at 922 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000)).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
law, he suggests that a judge should not be found to have acted im-
properly unless it is shown, by clear and convincing evidence,4 that
the judge knowingly or recklessly reached an erroneous decision.5
Having constructed the inquiry into judicial decisional malfeasance in
this manner, he then suggests that few attempts to find intentional
error by a judge are likely to be successful because the burden on
those making the charge would be so onerous.6
Perhaps because I teach media law, I am skeptical of any approach
that would use the defamation analog. Proving that a judge acted
willfully or with reckless disregard would necessarily require a
probing inquiry into the judge's subjective mental state that could
itself threaten the values of judicial independence.7 Moreover, as the
economists have taught us, the knowledge and reckless disregard
standard in libel law has turned out to be counterproductive. The
primary motivation of most defamation plaintiffs is to make a point
(regarding their own reputation and media fault) rather than to win
damages8 and if a similar motivation to make a political point is the
one that compels most of those attacking judges (which I suspect it
is), they are unlikely to be deterred by having to face a high threshold
in order to prove their claim. Their goals are reached merely by the
assertion of judicial misfeasance; they do not need further vindication
through official sanction.
But there are also more fundamental issues raised by Professor
Geyh's contention that judges may be held accountable for willfully
issuing erroneous decisions. Two interrelated questions immediately
arise. First, what does it mean for a judge to knowingly violate the
law? Second, does it make sense to sanction a judge for intentionally
reaching "erroneous" decisions in an intellectual climate dominated
by the legal realist view9 that law may be better understood as the
subjective interpretations of the judges exercising judicial power
4 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
5 The requirement in libel law that liability can only be based on a defendant's knowl-
edge or recklessness stems from the Supreme Court's landmark decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the media could not be held liable for defaming a
public official unless it acted with "actual malice" meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth).
6 Geyh, supra note 1, at 928-32.
7 Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979) (allowing a defamation plaintiff to in-
quire into the subjective mental state of a news editor).
I Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law after New York Times, in THE
COST OF LIBEL 69, 85 (Everett E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989).
9 See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 490-
94 (2002) (discussing the rise of legal realism in American legal thought).
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rather than as an application of an objective, transcendent set of prin-
ciples? 10 This essay will focus on these issues.
I. WHAT IS AN INTENTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE LAW?
What does it mean for a judge to intentionally violate the law? It
could mean, as Geyh suggests, that the judge has reached a decision
because of a desire for financial gain, personal favoritism, or because
of political, religious, racial, gender, or cultural bias. 1 But holding
judges responsible for deciding cases on those grounds is not contro-
versial and is little more than a variant of behavioral misfeasance of
the type Geyh discusses in his account of behavioral accountability.
1 2
There is then no need to sanction judges under a separate category of
decisional accountability in these circumstances.
The more difficult question concerns whether a judge should be
held accountable when she willfully decides a case "wrongly" be-
cause of disagreement with the governing law or with the result that
the application of the law would have in the case before her. Geyh,
apparently, would hold the judge accountable in these circumstances.
As he states,
devotees of civil disobedience the world over understand
that when they intentionally violate a law--even when
their motives are pure and the law is unjust-they are sub-
ject to sanctions. That should be especially true of judges
who, by virtue of taking an oath to uphold the law, have
foresworn law reform by unlawful means.
13
And there may be some easy cases. An anti-death penalty judge
who continually refuses to uphold capital punishment sentences, even
when they are clearly in the bounds of the relevant statutes and the
Constitution, may be appropriately sanctioned for ignoring her legal
duties. Similarly, a pro-life judge who categorically refuses to grant
judicial bypass to minors from parental notification requirements,
even when the circumstances clearly call for such action, should also
be penalized for ignoring his legal obligations.
But whether a judge should be disciplined for willfully violating
the law may not always be so clear. Professor Geyh himself recog-
10 See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (stating that there is no transcendental
body of federal common law).
I Geyh, supra note 1, at 922.
12 Id. at 919-22.
13 Id. at 923.
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nizes this point when he cites the example of Judge Anthony Kline's
use of a dissent against controlling precedent as a vehicle to trigger
reconsideration of a decision that he believed in error. 14 Kline may
have intentionally reached an erroneous result, but his purpose in do-
ing so was not to usurp the rule of law, but rather to take the steps
necessary to allow the judicial processes to reconsider what he be-
lieved was an erroneous decision. 15 Nevertheless, Geyh suggests that
Kline's actions could rightfully be considered inappropriate.
I am not so sure. Perhaps if the legal rule that Kline wanted re-
viewed was unassailable, he might be reasonably considered to have
flouted the rule of law. But if the legal rule in question merited recon-
sideration, Kline's action could equally be seen as facilitating the rule
of law's application.'
6
Let me offer some other examples. Assume that a judge believes
that ruling in a particular way, although correct on the law, might
undermine the ability of the judicial system to effectively function as
an institution. The federal judiciary, like other branches of govern-
ment, possesses a limited repository of political capital from which its
legitimacy is derived. Accordingly, a judge might be concerned, as
Alexander Bickel warned, that judicial authority could be undermined
if the courts too easily spend that capital by issuing opinions that are
perceived (even if erroneously) as being illegitimate or if they reach
decisions that are unlikely to be enforced by the other branches.' 7
Imagine, then, a judge who is sensitive to this concern and who, on
this basis, decides to ignore the governing rule of law and decide a
case "incorrectly." Should she be held accountable for her actions? I
have often thought (without proof), for example, that the Court's de-
cision in Marsh v. Chambers,8 upholding legislative prayer, was an
instance in which the Court ruled the way it did even though it did not
seriously believe it was following the correct rule of law. 19 Rather, it
14 Id.
15 For a fuller discussion of the controversy surrounding Judge Kline, see Sambhav N.
Sankar, Comment, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1233-37 (2000),
cited in Geyh, supra note 1, at 922 n.34.
16 The target of Judge Kline's dissent was the California Supreme Court's endorsement of
the practice of stipulated reversal, in Neary v. Regents of the University of California, 834 P.2d
119 (Cal. 1992), in which the preva.:::.. litigant agrees to have an adverse ruling reversed by an
appellate court in return for a payment from the losing side. Neary itself has received substantial
criticism, in large part as a result of the fact that allowing losing parties to buy their way out of
unfavorable judgments may be considered an undermining of the rule of law. See Stephen R.
Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal in the California
Supreme Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1033, 1078 (1993) (criticizing the practice of stipulated
reversal).
17 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, TIE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
IS 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
I9 That Chambers was "wrong" under existing Court precedent was not seriously debated.
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upheld the practice because it feared that Congress would ignore its
decision (and continue to open its sessions with legislative prayer)
and thus expose the federal judiciary's vulnerability to disobedience
by the other branches. But if I am correct in my assessment of the
case and the Court majority willfully violated the law, should the ma-
jority Justices be sanctioned or should the preservation of the courts'
legitimacy itself be considered a legitimate judicial function?
Or consider a case in which a judge knowingly reaches an "erro-
neous" decision because she believes her action is necessary to estab-
lish a greater judicial principle. Marbury v. Madison20 may have been
such a case. As every student of constitutional law knows, Marbury
served as a brilliant political maneuver, because Chief Justice John
Marshall was able to establish the power of federal judicial review by
issuing a decision that did not expose the judiciary to the then very
real risk that its decisions would not be enforced. 21 But in order to
place the case in this posture, Marshall had to make the very tenuous
claim that the First Congress had acted unconstitutionally in allowing
mandamus actions to be brought originally in the Supreme Court.22
Perhaps Justice Marshall thought his constitutional conclusion regard-
ing mandamus and original jurisdiction was correct (although his re-
fusal to defer to the judgment of the First Congress on this issue
seems to place his Marbury decision at odds with the deference he
later applied to their actions in McCulloch v. Maryland23). But as-
sume, for the moment, that Marshall did not believe that the Judiciary
Act of 1789 was unconstitutional in its grant of original jurisdiction
for mandamus actions and his holding in Marbury was merely a vehi-
cle to establish judicial review. Should Marshall be subject to sanc-
tion for such a gambit on grounds that his decision constituted an
intentional violation of the law? As with Marsh v. Chambers, the
conclusion that a deliberate rejection of governing legal principles
invariably constitutes a willful violation of law may not always be
clear.
Indeed, the Court had no answer to the dissent's claim that even a first-year law student would
easily find that the practice violated the Court's own Establishment Clause test. Id. at 800-01
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
20 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21 The decision dismissing the case on jurisdictional grounds meant that there was no rul-
ing for the Executive branch to enforce.
22 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 175.
23 17 U.S. 316, 401-02 (1819) (suggesting the Court should defer to the decision of the
First Congress with respect to whether Congress has the power, under the Commerce Clause, to
incorporate a national bank).
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Finally, what about cases like Bush v. Gore?24 Judge Posner, for
example, explains the case as one involving "rough justice," meaning
that the Court decided the case with little or no reference to estab-
lished legal principle in order to achieve a result that it believed best
served the overall interests of justice and national stability.25 As I
have written elsewhere,26 Bush v. Gore may not be the only example
of courts acting in this fashion, and ironically, New York Times v.
Sullivan,27 the case that provides the knowing and reckless disregard
standard that Geyh adopts, may also be an instance of this type of
case. But assuming that the Justices in Bush v. Gore and/or Sullivan
acted in good faith, should they be subject to sanction for willfully
violating the law if their purpose truly was to achieve rough justice?
To be sure, the examples of Judge Kline, Chambers, Marbury, and
Bush might be considered the exceptions that prove Professor Geyh's
rule. Each example, after all, involves highly unusual circumstances.
(Actually, I suspect that many participants in this Symposium might
suggest that at least some of the examples are not exceptions at all
and the judges in those particular cases should have been sanctioned.)
But whether one agrees with all of these examples or not, they do
illustrate a point. Not all intentional violations of the law are the
same. Indeed, not even all "good faith" violations, to use Professor
Geyh's terminology, are similar. Some may be based on civil disobe-
dience, as Geyh suggests, but others may be based on broader institu-
tional concerns. A rule that asks only whether a decisional error was
willful may miss this larger context.
II. WHAT IS AN ERRONEOUS DECISION?
Professor Geyh asserts that "the difficulty of proving judicial error
pales in comparison to the difficulty of proving that the error was
intentional. 28 I agree that proving intent will be extraordinarily diffi-
cult. The problem is that, in our current intellectual climate, proof of
error may not be any less. In fact, the proofs of intent and error may
be inextricably linked-at least in the highly visible constitutional law
24 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
25 Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election
Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 60. Posner's central contention in
this regard is that the decision saved the country from the months of debilitating wrangling that
would have occurred had the election been sent to the Congress for resolution. For a critique of
this rationale see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CM. L. REv. 695 (2001).
26 William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court, Bush v. Gore, and Rough Justice, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 787 (2001).
27 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28 Geyh, supra note 1, at 928.
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cases that have triggered the concern about judicial independence in
the first place.
Let me explain. In citing Professor Tribe's letter, Professor Geyh
has it exactly right.29 We live in a time of great constitutional flux.
Part of the reason for this, of course, is that a new generation of con-
servative thinkers have taken their seats on the bench and have begun
rethinking and recrafting constitutional jurisprudence in accord with
their judicial philosophy. 30 This alone is neither new nor startling.
Constitutional law has undergone other revolutions in previous eras.3'
What may be different about this era, however, is that the change
in constitutional law comes hand-in-hand with an increasing domi-
nance of the legal realist view that the meaning of constitutional law
depends on the identity of the judges deciding the case. This is not to
say that legal realism itself is new. To the contrary, legal realism has
been a part of American jurisprudence since at least the beginning of
the twentieth century. 32 But the notion that law reflects the philoso-
phical views of those empowered to decide cases is no longer a mere
abstraction or a matter discussed only in the hallowed halls of acade-
mia.33 It is an ingrained aspect of our political and legal culture. We
routinely assume, as a culture, that the personal judicial philosophies
of the judges decide cases.34
Indeed, the prevalence of legal realism is so extensive that it pro-
vided the rationale for a Court majority in Republican Party of Min-
nesota v. White.35 White involved a First Amendment challenge to a
canon of judicial conduct that prohibited judicial candidates from
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. 36 The
Court, per Justice Scalia, struck down the provision.37 Notably, in so
29 Id. (citing Lawrence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 294-95
(2005)).
30 See generally Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court 1998 Term Foreword: The New Con-
stitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REv. 29 (1999)
(discussing the new constitutional regime which superceded that of the New Deal and the Great
Society).
31 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (dis-
cussing revolutionary moments in constitutional law).
32 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 490-94; see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY VALUE 74-94 (1973) (describing the rise of legal realism).
33 See Carol M. Rose, Judicial Selection and the Mask of Non-Partisanship, 84 Nw. U. L.
REv. 929 (1990) (contending that the dominance of legal realism was exposed during the Bork
nomination).
34 See Charles E. Schumer, Judging by Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A19 (de-
scribing the rise of legal realism).
35 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
36 Id. at 768.
37 Id. at 788.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
doing, the Court rejected the claim that such a provision was neces-
sary to promote judicial impartiality. As Scalia explained:
when a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the
judge (as a candidate) had taken a particular stand, the
party taking the opposite stand is likely to lose. But not be-
cause of any bias against that party, or favoritism toward
the other party. Any party taking that position is just as
likely to lose. The judge is applying the law (as he sees it)
evenhandedly.38
Justice Scalia's conclusion could not be clearer. Case results depend
upon who is deciding the matter.
What then does all this have to do with erroneous decisions? The
answer is everything. If the law is the product of the judges empow-
ered to decide cases, then the concept of "erroneous" results takes on
a new meaning. Rather than decisions being right or wrong, they are
merely reflective of the current constitution (pun intended) of the
Court. In such circumstances, the only willful judicial "error" is that a
judge's beliefs as to a particular constitutional issue may be out of
sync with that of a majority of the Supreme Court. But is that truly
error or is it mere disagreement? Consider, for example, the relentless
efforts of some justices to change the law and how those efforts
should be characterized. Did Justice Brennan willfully err when he
continually dissented in a series of cases holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred federal question suits against the states?39 Or, in
seeking to overturn century old precedent, n° was he just out of step
with a majority of his colleagues? Is Justice Thomas intentionally
wrong when he insists, despite seventy years of precedent,41 that the
Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to regulate manufacturing
or agriculture?4 2 Or is he just awaiting the appointment of like-
minded jurists?43 And in any case, should Justice Brennan or Justice
Thomas be sanctioned for their actions?44
38 Id. at 776-77 (italics omitted).
39 E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259-60 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 688 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
41 E.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 1 1 (1942).
42 E.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
43 In this respect, Justice Rehnquist had it right in his dissent in Garcia from the decision
holding that the states could be subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). If you do not like the law
as it stands, simply dissent and wait for it to change. Indeed, in Garcia Rehnquist explicitly
stated that he was confident the law would change to support his position. Id. at 580.
44 Indeed, under this understanding of the meaning of law, even the so-called easy cases
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To be sure, different considerations apply to lower court judges
than to Supreme Court Justices with respect to the obligation to fol-
low the law. The lower courts are bound by precedent in a way that
the Supreme Court is not. But unless a lower court judge were to ex-
plicitly announce that she reached a particular result because she is
under no obligation to follow Supreme Court precedent,45 the essen-
tial point will remain the same. When the fabric of constitutional law
itself is up for grabs, how can a judge's constitutional ruling be will-
fully erroneous?
4 6
CONCLUSION
Professor Geyh has undertaken an important effort in an attempt to
insulate the judiciary from inappropriate political attack. His attempt,
however, rests on two important premises: first, that all intentional
violations of the law are problematic; and second, that correct and
incorrect decisions can be appropriately distinguished. The first asser-
tion however, ignores that intentional violations of the law may often
serve larger values while the second treats the law as a more certain
construct than our current intellectual climate allows. To be sure, Pro-
fessor Geyh is correct in seeing the current political attacks on judges
as threatening to judicial independence. But I am afraid that his solu-
tion, or perhaps any other, will not make that particular problem go
away. When law is conceived as politics, it is not surprising that con-
troversial decisions trigger political reactions.
that I mentioned at the outset may not be so simple. The capital punishment opponent may
merely be anticipating that a new Court will find all capital punishment unconstitutional. The
pro-life judge may believe that an appropriately constituted Court will find all abortion to be
unconstitutional. If so, can it be said that the judge who refuses to enforce the death penalty or a
parental notification bypass has intentionally violated the law?
45 One such instance of this occurred in Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 554 F.
Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983) where the district court held that it was under no obligation
to follow the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause precedents.
46 Professor Geyh cites Judge Roy Moore's decision to ignore a federal court order de-
manding that he remove the Ten Commandments from his courtroom as an example of a willful
violation of the law. Geyh, supra note 1, at 928. Indeed it was. But Moore's action was not in
the form of a judicial ruling. Rather it was taken in response to a court order directed against
him.
